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LEVELING LOCALISM AND RACIAL INEQUALITY IN
EDUCATION THROUGH THE NO CHILD LEFT
BEHIND ACT PUBLIC CHOICE PROVISION
Erika K. Wilson*
School district boundary lines play a pivotal role in shaping students' educational
opportunities.Living on one side of a school district boundary rather than another can mean the difference between being able to attend a high-achievingresourceenriched school or having to attend a low-achievingresource-deprivedschool.
Despite the prominent role that school district boundary lines play in dictatingeducational opportunities for students, remedies formulated by the federal
judiciary-the institutionfrequently looked upon to address issues of school segregation and inequality-areineffective in amelioratingdisparitiesbetween school
districts. They are ineffective because the federal judiciary evidences a doctrinal
preferencefor localism in its school equity jurisprudence. This doctrinalpreference
for localism has led thefederaljudiciary to, among other things,find inter-district
school desegregationplans unconstitutionalwhile upholding the constitutionality
of schoolfinancing schemes with gross disparities in per-pupil spending between
school districts.
This Article suggests that a new remedial paradigm that embraces regionalismas
an antidote to the localismfound in the federaljudiciary'sschool equity jurisprudence is necessary to combat segregation and inequality between school districts.
One potential remedial solution lies in the No Child Left Behind Act public choice
provision, which allows students to transferfrom afailing school to a non-failing
one. This Article argues that Congress should amend the public choice provision
during NCLB's next re-authorizationby adopting a statutory framework similar
to the framework found in portions of the Fair Housing Act, which embraces regionalism and citizen mobility as a means offacilitatingintegration and equality.

INTRODUCTION

"I thought I would actually have a choice," said Christine Bryant,
whose son Tevin attempted to exercise his right under the federal No
Child Left Behind Act to transferfrom Towers High School in DeKalb

*
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University of Baltimore School of Law Summer Research Fellowship.
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County, Georgia to a better-performing school.' Towers High School
has an enrollment that is ninety-five percent African-American.2 Sixtyseven percent of the student body is considered socio-economically
disadvantaged.' At the time Tevin attempted to transferfrom Towers
High School, the school failed to satisfy academic proficiency requirements under the No Child Left Behind Act for three consecutiveyears.
Ten of the twenty-one high schools in the DeKalb County School District where Towers High School is located also failed to satisfy No
Child Left Behind academic proficiency requirements. The nine
schools that satisfied the testing requirements could not accommodate
transfer requests by Tevin andfifteen hundred students who sought to
transfer' As a result, Tevin was presented with only two options:
transferto a vocational/technicalschool or take online courses.
Much of the segregation and inequality that characterizes education in America today occurs along school district boundary
lines. While it is now illegal to deny children equal educational opportunities because of their race,' it is perfectly legal to provide
disparate education opportunities to children based on where they
live. Tevin's story exemplifies this predicament. The No Child Left
Behind ("NCLB") public choice remedy is supposed to help alleviate disparities in educational opportunities by allowing students to
transfer from poor-performing schools to better-performing
schools." Regrettably, however, very few students are able to utilize
the NCLB public choice remedy largely as a result of a geographic
restriction contained in the remedy, which only allow students to
make intra-school district transfers rather than inter-school district
transfers.9
1.

Kristina Torres, Options Limited on 'No Child' Transfers in DeKalb,

ATLANTA

J.-

CoNsT.,July 25, 2007, at B3.

2007 ADEQUATE YEARLY PRO(2007), available at http://www.doe.kl2.ga.us/
ReportingFW.aspx? PageReq=103&Schoolld=5124&T=1&FY=2007 (reporting that 294 of the
school's 307 students in 2007 were Black).
3.
Id. (follow "School Profile" hyperlink; then follow "Facts" hyperlink).
Id. (follow "NCLB/AYP" hyperlink; then follow hyperlinks at left to move between
4.
2.

GRESs

See

GA. DEP'T OF EDUC.,

REPORT: TowERs

No

CHILD LEFT BEHIND

HIGH SCHOOL

years).

5.
Torres, supranote 1.
6.
Id.
7.
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
See, e.g., 147 CONG. REc. E437 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2001) (statement of Rep.
8.
Boehner) (stating that the NCLB public choice provision "will give students a chance, parents a choice, and schools a charge to be the best in the world").
See 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1)(E)(i) (2006). The text of the statute reads in relevant
9.
part: "In the case of a school identified for school improvement under this paragraph, the
local educational agency shall ... provide all students enrolled in the school with the option
to transfer to another public school served by the local educational agency . . . ." Id. (emphasis
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The geographic restriction is significant because more often
than not, poor-performing schools that are required to offer the
public choice remedy are segregated by both race and class and are
usually located within the same school district.o In contrast, betterperforming schools that are eligible to receive transfers tend to
have fewer minorities and socio-economically disadvantaged students but are also clustered within the same school district."
That school quality is demarcated by school district boundary
lines is no coincidence. Rather, it is a consequence of concerted
policy decisions and laws. Local control over schools is a deeply
rooted tradition in public education.1 2 In furtherance of this ethos,
school district boundary lines are drawn so that students for the
most part attend schools in close proximity to where they live. As
a result, school district demographics mirror the racial and economic segregation that exists in residential neighborhoods. 4
Despite the prominent role that school district boundary lines
play in dictating educational opportunities for students, students
are rarely given the chance to attend schools outside of the school

added); see alsoJennifer Jellison Holme & Amy Stuart Wells, School Choice Beyond District Borders: Lessons for the Reauthorization of NCLB from InterdistrictDesegregation and Open Enrollment
Plans, in IMPROVING ON No CHILD LEFT BEHIND 139, 143 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2008)
(noting that since NCLB was implemented, fewer than 6% of students enrolled in schools in
which the transfer option is offered have actually taken advantage of the opportunity to
transfer to a better performing school).
See, e.g., CYNTHIA G. BROWN, CHOOSING BETTER SCHOOLs: A REPORT ON STUDENT
10.
TRANSFERS UNDER THE No CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT 63 (Dianne M. Pich6 & William L.
Taylor eds., 2004) (noting that "[iun many urban school districts the number of schools in
need of improvement is so large that there literally are not enough successful schools from
which to choose").
11.
See generally Erin Dillon, PlottingSchool Choice: The Challenges of CrossingDistrictLines,
EDuc. SECTOR REP., Aug. 2008, available at http://www.educationsector.org/usr_doc/
InterdistrictChoice.pdf (advocating inter-district choice as a more effective means than
intra-district choice at improving student performance).
12.
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974) ("No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools. . . .").
Linking school attendance with residence purportedly furthers local control by al13.
lowing communities to tailor the education students receive to fit the needs of the
community and allowing citizens to participate in formulating education policy. See
KATHRYN A. McDERMoTT, CONTROLLING PUBLIC EDUCATION: LOCALISM VERSUS EQUITY 16
(1999).
See CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, AFTER Brown: THE RISE AND RETREAT OF SCHOOL DE14.
SEGREGATION 59 (2004) ("[M]any of the nation's large urban areas are checkered with
dozens of separate school districts, and this balkanization is an important factor in the racial
segregation of public schools."); see also AMY STUART WELLS ET AL., BOUNDARY CROSSING
FOR DIVERSITY, EQUITY AND ACHIEVEMENT: INTER-DISTRICT SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND
EDUCATIONAL

OPPORTUNITY

1

(2009),

available at

http://www.tc.columbia.edu/i/

a/document/11666_WellsFinal-wBleeds.pdf ("[A] full 84% of racial/ethnic segregate on
in U.S. public schools occurs between and not within school districts." (citing CLOTFELTER,

supra)).
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district that encompasses their residence." The federal judiciarythe institution frequently looked upon to remedy issues of school
segregation and inequality-has done little to nothing to remedy
racial and economic segregation between school districts. Instead,
the federal judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, has arguably
contributed to the inter-district disparities by legitimizing the primacy of localism in its school equity jurisprudence.
Time and again, the federal judiciary has deferred to local
school officials in their school financing schemes and student assignment plans, 8 even when the decisions of these local officials
have adverse impacts on educational opportunities for poor and
minority students. Doctrinally, the result is that the federal judiciary is situated such that it cannot adequately address issues of racial

and economic inequality in schools.
Several noted educational reformers have suggested amending
the NCLB public choice provision to encourage inter-district transfers as a non-judicial means of combating increasing segregation
and inequality between school districts.'9 This Article agrees with
15.
While a number of states have enacted voluntary public choice programs which allow students to attend non-neighborhood schools, the majority of such choice programs still
limit the choice programs to intra-district choice programs. Thus, similar to the NCLB public choice program, students are allowed to choose to attend schools within the same school
district as their neighborhood school, but for the most part are not permitted to cross
school district boundary lines. See James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of
School Choice, 111 YALE L.J. 2043, 2064-65 (2002) (describing the forms that public school
choice programs have taken and concluding that most public school choice programs involve intra-district choice).
16.
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The DeconstitutionalizationofEducation, 36 Loy. U. CHI.
L.J. 111, 112 (2004) (arguing that over the last thirty years "the Supreme Court, and the
lower federal courts, have done nothing to advance desegregation of schools or to equalize
expenditures for education"); Kimberley Jenkins Robinson, The Case for a CollaborativeEnforcement Model for a FederalRight to Education,40 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 1653, 1660-67, 1722-26
(2007) (discussing the federal judiciary's failure to implement effective school desegregation plans and arguing that a federal right to education be recognized through spending
legislation that the federal and state governments collaboratively enforce).
17.
See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1973) (upholding local property tax school funding schemes that result in gross disparities in perpupil spending between school districts).
18.
See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (severely limiting the situations in
which inter-district remedies can be used to remedy school segregation).
19.
See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 10, at 21 (recommending that the Department of Education revise the NCLB transfer provision to strongly encourage inter-district choice);
Jonathan Kozol, TransferringUp, N.Y. TIMEs,July 11, 2007, at A19 (suggesting that the NCLB
public choice provision be revised to encourage intra-district transfers); Richard A. Kahlenberg, Helping Children Move From Bad Schools to Good Ones, THE CENTURY FOUND., 2 (June 15,
2006), http://tcf.org/publications/pdfs/pb571/kahlenbergsoa6-15-06.pdf (stating that the
NCLB transfer provision "should be amended so that low-income students stuck in failing
schools are able to transfer to high-quality, solidly middle-class public schools, sometimes in
other districts, and so that these schools actually are encouraged to accept the transferring
students").
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the various calls to amend the public choice provision to better
facilitate inter-district transfers.20 It argues that the federal judiciary's commitment to localism in its school equity jurisprudence
makes judicial remedies an ineffective conduit for achieving equalized educational opportunities for poor and minority students.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I provides a brief discussion of localism and the role that localism plays in limiting
educational opportunities for poor and minority students. Part II
analyzes key federal school desegregation and school finance decisions and contends that the federal judiciary's doctrinal preference
for localism has crystallized racial and economic disparities between school districts. Part III offers a brief overview of what
segregation in schools looks like today and argues that in order to
combat increased segregation and inequality between school districts, a regionalist approach similar to the one used in
interpreting portions of the Fair Housing Act ("FHA") is necessary.
Part IV examines the role that NCLB plays in challenging the paradigm of localism in education and contends that NCLB could do
more to alleviate the detrimental effects of localism if the statute's
public choice provision were amended to better encourage interdistrict choice. Part V concludes.

I.

LOCALISM AND EDUCATION

Over the last three decades, metropolitan areas have experiand local government
enced significant fragmentation
proliferation." In most metropolitan areas, the fragmentation has
been the result of the propagation of numerous political jurisdictions-usually suburbs located outside the core central city area
that are typically afforded fiscal and regulatory autonomy separate
from the core central city.22 Significantly, this metropolitan fragmentation typically occurs along racial and economic lines-poor
and minority citizens populate central cities while more middle
20.
This Article deliberately eschews normative questions as to the pedagogical advantages and disadvantages of the standardized tests as a basis for measuring student
progress and enforcing accountability. It instead focuses on the broader concept of the
public choice remedy as a way of creating student mobility in order to combat principles of
localism in education that have been detrimental to the educational opportunities of poor
and minority students.
See generally Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan
21.
Areas, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1115, 1123-44 (1996) (describing the nature of metropolitan fragmentation, the permeability of local legal boundary lines, and the problems with fairly and
efficiently allocating public services and goods that result from metropolitan fragmentation).
22.
Id. at 1136-38.
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class and white citizens populate the suburbs.23 The demographics
of metropolitan fragmentation have serious implications for the
provision of education in America. This is because school district
lines are drawn such that school districts in the core central cities
and suburbs reflect the racial and economic demography of their
respective localities. To the extent that educational opportunities
and outcomes are influenced by race and class," school district
boundary lines therefore play a decisive role in determining the
quality of education that a student will receive.
Against this backdrop, this Part examines the role that localism
plays in the maintenance of school district boundary lines, despite
the uneven educational opportunities that result from them. Section A provides an overview of localism and its theoretical
underpinnings. Section B then examines and critiques localism in
the education context.

for Localism
A. TheoreticalJustifications

Localism is broadly defined as a belief that decentralized, independent local government structures are preferable to a
centralized government structure, particularly in metropolitan regions. One of the central tenets of localism is that the provision of
government services "ought to be controlled locally, with the interests of local residents as the exclusive desideratum of local decision

23.
See Myron Orfield, Land Use and Housing Policies to Reduce Concentrated Poverty and
Racial Segregation, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 877, 881-84 (2006) (discussing the effects of housing discrimination and urban sprawl and noting that the end result of both housing
discrimination and urban sprawl is that low income individuals and minorities are relegated
to inner-suburban and central-city housing while more affluent and middle-class whites tend
to move to the outer-ring suburbs). It is important to note that while large numbers of minorities are increasingly moving from urban to suburban areas, they tend to be limited to
certain communities. See, e.g., id. at 880 ("[A]recent study of metropolitan Boston showed
that nearly half of Black homebuyers were concentrated in only seven of 126 communities."
(citing Guy STUART, SEGREGATION IN THE BOSTON METROPOLITAN AREA AT THE END OF
THE 20m CENTURY 5 (2000))).
SeeJames E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 272-80 (1999) (ex24.
plaining the relationship between residential segregation and the racial and economic
demographics of urban school districts).
See john a. powell, Opportunity-Based Housing, 12 J. AFFORDABLE Hous. & CMTY.
25.
DEV. L. 188, 198 (2003) ("[Sltudents educated in economically and racially segregated
schools receive substandard educations. [And,] when a large number of students in a school
face these challenges, the cumulative effect is that the ability of the school to provide a quality education is significantly impeded.").
See Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter:
26.
Addressing Barriersto New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 1988 (2000) (defining localism as a
preference for decentralized local governance structures).
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makers."2 Localism is often promoted within the scholarly literature on two grounds: (1) that it fosters democratic citizen
participation and (2) that it results in an efficient allocation of
public goods and services. This Section discusses each of these justifications in turn.
1. Citizen Participation
Proponents of localism suggest that a smaller local government
with enhanced powers allows citizens to participate more meaningfully in their own governance." For example, Professor Gerald
Frug suggests that citizen participation is critical to the success of a
democracy because it allows citizens to take responsibility for their
own destiny in their daily lives. 29 He argues that localism, by encouraging citizen participation, increases the likelihood that
citizen contributions will make a difference in the policy outcome
and that the resulting policy solution will actually be an effective
one for the locality because citizens who live in the locality will
have helped shape the solution.3 0 He further argues that meaningful citizen participation can only be cultivated through small levels
of government because individuals are not
likely to participate in the decisionmaking of an entity of any
size unless that participation will make a difference in his life.
Power and participation are inextricably linked: a sense of
powerlessness tends to produce apathy rather than participation, while the existence of power encourages those able to
3'
participate in its exercise to do so.
On the other hand, when an individual's life is controlled by a distant centralized government with a hierarchical chain of

27.

Richard Briffault, Our Localism Part II-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L.

REV. 346, 444 (1990).

See, e.g., JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY 3-4 (1980) (argu28.
ing that what he terms "unitary democracies"-democracies in which parties come together
and reach consensus instead of making decisions by a majority vote-meet the needs of
people in ways that "adversary democracies" cannot); Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal
Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1068-73 (1980) (noting that the development of the mod-

ern Western city is often critiqued on the grounds that it limits the ability of individuals to
control their own lives and arguing that reducing the scale of political decision-making is
one of the most effective ways to allow people to regain some control over their own lives).
29.
SeeFrug, supra note 28, at 1068-69.
See id.
30.
Id. at 1070.
31.
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command, the individual is likely to feel powerless and decline to
participate in political decision-making."

2. Efficiency
The second argument most often advanced in support of localism is that it will result in the efficient provision of public goods
and services. Professor Charles Tiebout hypothesized that decentralization of power to several local governments will create
market-like competition among local governments for citizens.
According to Tiebout's hypothesis, each local government would
offer a mix of public goods and services in an effort to attract citizens.3 1 Citizens would then "vote with their feet" and gravitate to
the community that offered their desired mix of public goods and
35
service. For example, people who desire a high quality of a certain public good would move to communities with high levels of
that particular public good and be willing to pay high taxes to pay
for the public good.36 By contrast, individuals with low demands for
quality public goods would choose other communities with low
levels of public services and low taxes.
B. A Critiqueof Citizen Participationand Efficiency Justifications
for Localism in the Education Context
In the education context, local control over schools is often justified on the same grounds as the broader localism doctrine:
citizen participation and efficiency. With respect to citizen participation, one of the primary philosophical arguments for local
control over schools is that it fosters democratic participation by
allowing citizens to participate in decision-making." More specifically, proponents of local control contend that the governing
bodies of the school districts (i.e., school boards) will be in close
32.
Id.
33.
Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theoiy of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. Ecow. 416, 41718 (1956).
34.
Id. at 417.
35.
See id.
36.
See id. at 418.
37.
See id.
38.
These justifications have been advanced by lawmakers, courts, and scholars alike.
See, e.g., Owens v. Colo. Cong. of Parents, Teachers and Students, 92 P.3d 933, 941 (Colo.
2004) (striking down a school voucher program on the grounds that it violated a state constitutional requirement for local control over public school instruction).
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proximity to the people and therefore the people will have an opportunity to easily influence education policy."
In reality, however, citizen participation in local board of education decision-making is often very limited." Citizen attendance at
board meetings and voter turnout for board of education elections
are traditionally low in both affluent and non-affluent school districts.4 Moreover, even when citizens do attempt to participate in
board meetings, many board meetings are structured such that the
opportunity for public discussion is limited and any public discussion that does occur typically does not relate to or influence board
decisions. 42 Most importantly, citizen participation is rendered
meaningless if a locality lacks the financial or political resources to
translate citizen participation into actual policy that meets citizen
needs and desires. In poorer school districts where residents do
not have the means or the political clout to influence school board
policy, citizen participation is not likely to make a significant difference." Thus, the citizen participation justification for localism
in education simply does not bear out. Citizens do not actually participate in large numbers at the board of education level, and in
some instances, even if they do, their participation is ineffective.
The Tieboutian efficiency justification for local control of
schools is also flawed. Localism in education is often defended on
the ground that diverse schools and school districts provide citizens the option of "shopping" around and locating themselves in
school districts that meet the preferred educational needs of their
39.
See Aaron J. Saiger, The School DistrictBoundary Problem, 42 URB. LAw. 495, 519-520
(2010) (arguing that local control allows for parental involvement and makes public schools
and school districts "more likely to be genuine 'functional communities' than other local
polities" (footnote omitted)). But seeMcDERMOTr, supra note 13, at 53.
40.
McDERMOTr, supra note 13, at 54-60 (describing the limited nature of public participation in school governance and concluding that the general public for the most part is
not attentive to the activities of local boards of education and do not participate in boards'
decision making processes).
41.
See, e.g., id. at 55 (reporting the findings of a study that showed that voter turnout
in Stanton, Connecticut was substantially similar to three other towns); see also HARVEY J.
TUCKER & L. HARMON ZEIGLER, PROFESSIONAL VERSUS THE PUBLIC: ArrTUDES, COMMUNICATION, AND RESPONSE IN SCHOOL DISTRICTS 229 (1980) (finding that a "small minority of
citizens vote on school district elections and attend public meetings").
42.
See, e.g., McDERMoTr, supra note 13, at 60-67 (studying the structure of board of
education meetings in various communities in Connecticut and concluding that most of the
deliberations on substantive education policy issues occurs in special meetings, leaving larger meetings open to the public largely for ceremonial functions). Most of the people who
attended and commented at meetings open to the public were school principals or other
school district employees; the public comments made at the meetings rarely related to the
items actually on the board agendas. Id.
43.
See Cashin, supra note 26, at 2045-46.
44.
See id.
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children.4 5 However, the model erroneously assumes unlimited citizen mobility. In the education context, the model assumes that citcitizens will move to a school district that provides them with the
optimal level and quality of education for their children. While it is
indeed true that for some families residential choice is informed by
the quality of the neighborhood schools, residential mobility is on46
ly an option for a limited number of families. Instead, because
home prices in residential areas with high-quality schools are often
expensive, parents dissatisfied with their children's schools more
often than not "vote with their feet" by attempting to change
schools rather than changing residences.4 ' This is particularly true
for less affluent parents who lack the financial means to move into
better residential areas with better schools.
Furthermore, while parents should undoubtedly have some say
in the quality of education that their children receive, the notion
that parental "preference" or "choice" should be a guiding principle for strict local control of schools is inappropriate because
education bears more resemblance to a public rather than a private good.8 Put another way, since state governments have the
responsibility under most state constitutions to provide public education, parents should not have the 'choice' to provide their
children with an adequate or inadequate education.

SeeJack Buckley & Mark Schneider, School Choice, ParentalInformation, and Tiebout
45.
Sorting: Evidencefrom Washington, DC, in THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT Firry 101, 103-104 (William A. Fischel ed., 2006) (finding that households expend more time and resources
shopping for education than other services); cf San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1972) ("[L]ocal control means ... the freedom to devote more money to
the education of one's children."); Tiebout, supra note 33, at 418 (explaining that people
choose communities in which to live based on which local government best satisfies his or
her preferences).
See Buckley & Schneider, supra note 45, at 104 ("[A]lmost one-quarter of parents
46.
in the nation report that they moved to their current neighborhood so that their child can
enroll in the local school and this proportion increases with parents' level of educational
attainment.").
47.
Id. at 104-05 (noting the results of a survey of parents in Washington, D.C. and
stating that while many parents considered moving their residence as a means to improve
their school choices, the most common forms of exercising choice were to try and get their
children into a charter school or to try to exercise intra-district choice).
See McDERMOTT, supra note 13, at 21 (acknowledging that education has dual
48.
characteristics of both a private good and a public good, but arguing that education is predominately a public good because "[p]ublic goods are characterized by economies ofjoint
supply and nonexcludability," and that public education fits the description of a public good
because "[w]hen individuals learn, the effects of that learning accrue not only to them but
also to society as a whole by contributing to a well-trained workforce and an educated citizenry").
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The benefits and costs of maintaining an educated populace accrue to society as a whole.4 9 The fact that most states require a
minimum level of education and tax their citizens to ensure free
public education demonstrates50 that there is indeed a collective
interest in maintaining a well-educated populace. Yet the Tieboutian efficiency justification for localism treats public education as if
it were a private good rather than a public good insofar as it allows
market-like principles to control the distribution of educational
resources. In reality, market failure is all too common: for poor
and minority residents unable to relocate to more privileged communities with higher-quality schools, there is no Tieboutian choice.
To be fair, local control of schools has some benefits, namely the
logistical ease of governance and the flexibility to respond to
communities' needs and preferences." However, local control also
has an exclusionary side insofar as it creates inequitable distribution of educational resources along geographic lines, which are
segregated by both race and class. Neither citizen participation nor
efficiency justifies adhering to localism in education. Instead, these
purported justifications perpetuate pervasive falsities about the racial inequalities that now exist between schools and school districts
throughout the country. As discussed infra in Part IV, the local control paradigm should be reconsidered in order to allow for a more
inclusive and just distribution of educational resources.
II.

THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 'S AFFIRMATION OF LOCALISM IN
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND SCHOOL FINANCE CASES

As discussed above, localism has long been accepted as the preferred model of education in America, even as its deleterious effect
on poor and minority communities has become better understood.
Not only has localism in education been accepted as a matter of
policy, but it has also been vigorously defended by the Supreme
J.

THE BENEFITS TO TAXPAYERS FROM IN(2009), available at http://
www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RANDMG686.sum.pdf (finding that an increase
in educational attainment increases both the likelihood of employment and wages, when
employed, for an individual, and reduces the likelihood that the individual will participate
in social support programs).
See Thomas Kleven, FederalizingPublic Education, 55 VILL. L. REV. 369, 392 (2010)
50.
(noting that most states' constitutions obligate states to provide free public education);
Compulsoy School Age Requirements, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://
www.ncst.org/print/educ/CompulsorySchAgeChart.pdf (last updated Feb. 2006).
See, e.g., Saiger, supra note 39, at 518-25 (describing the benefits of localism in ed51.
ucation and noting the important role it plays in inculcating community values to children).
49.
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Court in its school desegregation and school finance jurisprudence.
A. The School Desegregation Cases: A Localist Beginning
Since its 1955 decision in Brown v. Board of Education ("Brown
Il")," the Supreme Court has consistently expressed a doctrinal
preference for principles of localism at the expense of the constitutional rights of minority and poor students. The Court's reasoning
in Brown H is particularly instructive. There, the Court was faced
with the question of the appropriate remedy to impose in order to
correct the constitutional violation found in the 1954 Brown v.
Board of Education ("Brown f1)53 decision. The Court declined to
grant the immediate injunctive relief requested by the plaintiffs
and instead remanded the cases back to the local district courts to
formulate remedies, reasoning that the formulation of remedies
would require solutions of "varied local ...

problems" and "the

elimination of a variety of obstacles.",4
The "local school problems" and "obstacles" referenced by the
Court were undoubtedly the local customs or policies that subjugated minorities, particularly Black citizens. These local customs
were so deeply ingrained in some communities that various state
attorneys general advocated for gradual rather than immediate
relief because of the threat of white mob violence if schools were
integrated. By ordering gradual rather than immediate relief, the
Court allowed local school districts to set the tone as to the pace
and scope of school desegregation efforts. In turn, many Southern
states seized upon Brown IIas a license to stall desegregation efforts

52.

349 U.S. 294 (1955).

347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that the segregation of races in public schools consti53.
tuted a denial of equal protection).
Brown HI,349 U.S. at 299-300.
54.
See, e.g., Brief for the Attorney General of Florida as Amicus Curiae at 108-09,
55.
Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1954), 1954 WL 45715 (noting that the majority of whites disfavored
the desegregating schools and that "there is a minority of whites who would actively and
violently resist desegregation, especially immediate desegregation"); Brief for Harry McMullan, Attorney General of North Carolina, as Amicus Curiae at 37, Brown II, 349 U.S. 294
(1954), 1954 WL 45720 (arguing that the immediate desegregation of schools would likely
lead to "[c]onflicts in the schoolroom, on the playground, and between parents and teachers [which] may lead to racial bitterness in a community and bring to North Carolina the
bloody race riots which have disgraced cities and states"); see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 253-54
(1962) (noting the Court's desire to issue an opinion in Brown II that would reduce opposition and promote flexibility and tolerance among whites).
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or to not desegregate at all." As a result, very little desegregation
occurred in the years immediately following Brown II. Four years
after the decision, only 0.15% of Black children in the South were
attending desegregated schools, and nine years out, only 1.2%
were in desegregated schools. In fact, meaningful school desegregation did not occur until the mid-1960s when the Supreme Court
began eschewing principles of localism and requiring schools to
take affirmative steps to dismantle segregated school systems.58 In
1971, the Court went even further, holding in Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education that federal courts have broad authority when exercising their equitable remedial authority to
formulate remedies in desegregation cases, including the authority
to order busing and to implement racial ratios.59
B. Normalization of Localism: San Antonio v. Rodriguez
and Milliken v. Bradley
The Court's aggressive interventionist approach toward school
desegregation was short-lived. Immediately after Swann, demonstrations broke out and "white flight" out of cities into suburbs in60
increased. In part because of this unexpected backlash, the Court
went on to significantly constrict its interpretation of the scope of
the Fourteenth Amendment in later school equity cases involving
issues of school finance and school desegregation. As discussed
below, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez6 ' and
Milliken v. Bradley62 are two cases that exemplify the Court's retreat
See, e.g., Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1968) (finding "freedom of
56.
choice" plan unconstitutional where small number of students chose to attend school in
which their race was in the minority and plan burdened students and parents with the responsibility of desegregating); Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 229-32 (1964)
(holding that the closing of schools as a means to thwart desegregation efforts was unconstitutional); McNeese v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 674-76 (1963) (stating that Black children
could not be precluded from enrolling in nonsegregated schools for failing to exhaust State
administrative remedies); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1958) (rejecting the Board of
Education's request to postpone desegregation efforts due to extreme public hostility).
See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA.
57.
L. REV. 7, 9 (1994).
58.
See, e.g., Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38 (holding that schools have an affirmative duty to
eliminate segregated school systems "root and branch"); Griffin, 377 U.S. at 232 (requiring
schools to "quick ly] and effective [ly]" eliminate vestiges of segregation in schools).
59.
402 U.S. 1, 15-18, 22-27 (1971). Though it should be noted that the Court characterizes the use of racial ratios as limited to "no more than a starting point in the process of
shaping a remedy, rather than an inflexible requirement" Id. at 25.
GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET RE60.
VERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 10-18 (1996).

61.
62.

411 U.S. 1 (1973).
418 U.S. 717 (1974).

638

University of MichiganJournalof Law Reform

[VOL. 44:3

from aggressive intervention and its subsequent embrace of localism principles.

1. San Antonio v. Rodriguez

In San Antonio v. Rodfiguez, the Court decided the constitutionality of the State of Texas' school financing system. Under the Texas
school financing system, school districts received a portion of their
funding from the State and the remainder of their funding from
property taxes collected on properties within the school district.
The plaintiffs, a class of Mexican-American parents from an urban
school district in San Antonio, argued that the financing system
resulted in substantial disparities in per-pupil expenditures between school districts due to substantial differences in the value of
assessable property among the school districts." The plaintiffs argued that because the Texas school financing system resulted in
inter-district disparities in per-pupil spending, the financing system
violated their equal protection rights because it discriminated
based upon wealth.6 5 The plaintiffs further argued that the discriminatory financing system violated the Fourteenth Amendment
because it interfered with their "fundamental right" to an education." The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the Texas school
"financing system [did not] discriminate[] against any definable
category of 'poor' people [nor did it] result[] in the absolute deprivation of education" for any class of people.67 The Court did not
find a fundamental right to education. Analyzing the constitutionality of the Texas school finance system under a rational basis
test rather than applying strict scrutiny, the Court found the school
financing scheme constitutional, despite the stark inter-district disparities in per-pupil spending.69
63.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 6-9.
64.
Id. at 11-13. The plaintiffs compared the amount per-pupil expended by Edgewood Independent School District, which contained schools located in a residential area
with little commercial or industrial property and residential property occupied by predominately poor Mexican-American residents, with the Alamo Heights Independent School
District, which contained schools located in a highly residential area occupied by predominately upper-middle class white residents. The Court noted that due to the value of the
assessable property in the respective school districts, the Edgewood Independent School
District was only able to spend $356.00 per pupil while the Alamo Heights Independent
School District was able to spend $594.00 per pupil. Id.
65.
Id. at 15-16.
66.
Id. at 29.
67.
Id. at 25.
68.
Id. at 35.
69.
Id. at 54-55.
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In concluding that the Texas school financing system did not violate the plaintiffs' equal protection rights nor impinge upon a
fundamental right, the Court invoked Frugian and Tieboutian notions about how local control over education would cultivate
citizen participation and foster competition for educational excellence. The majority opinion suggests:
[L] ocal control means . .. the freedom to devote more money

to the education of one's children. Equally important, however, is the opportunity it offers for participationin the decisionmaking
process that determines how those local tax dollars will be
spent. Each locality is free to tailor local programs to local needs.
Pluralism also affords some opportunity for experimentation,
innovation, and a healthy competitionfor educationalexcellence."'
Rodriguez represented a significant retreat from the Court's interventionist approach in cases like Swann. Instead, as Justice Marshall
noted in his lengthy dissent, the Court was content to favor localized
education over the ability of poor and minority children to obtain
equal educational opportunities.7 ' The Frugian and Tieboutian language in Rodriguez ignores the reality that school districts with
poorer tax bases will not be able to effectively "tailor [school] programs to local needs," because the poorer districts do not have the
money to do so. Similarly, the idea that "local control" results in
"competition for educational excellence" suffers from the same fallacies that discredit Tiebout's justification for localism broadly:
because poorer localities lack the fiscal capacity to compete, the
only competition that will occur is between more affluent localities
or school districts. These realities have become abundantly clear
several years after the Rodriguez decision.
2. Milliken v. Bradley
Two years after Rodriguez, the Court decided Milliken v. Bradley,
a case involving the constitutionality of an inter-jurisdictional
school desegregation plan between an urban and suburban school
district in the Detroit metropolitan area. Milliken arose at a time
in the 1970s when white flight to the suburbs became an increasing barrier to formulating effective school desegregation plans,

70.
71.
72.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 84-85, 126 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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particularly in the northern parts of the country.13 As a result of
white flight, many urban school districts had too few white students
to implement meaningful desegregation plans. The Detroit metropolitan area exemplified this problem: African-Americans
predominantly inhabited the city while whites populated the surrounding suburbs in greater number.74 The plaintiffs in Milliken
alleged that the City of Detroit's school system was segregated due
to the de jure practice of state officials.7 5 The District Court and the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals approved a school desegregation
plan encompassing the City of Detroit and adjacent suburban
school districts. 6 Both courts acknowledged that given the racial
makeup of the City and suburban schools, "any less comprehensive
a solution than a metropolitan area plan would result in an all
black school system immediately surrounded by practically all
white suburban school systems."" Both courts also reasoned that
formulating an inter-district school desegregation plan was within
the equitable remedial authority of the federal district court because the City of Detroit's de jure school segregation practices were
attributable to the State and the "State controls the [school district] whose action is necessary to remedy the harmful effects of
the State acts."
The Supreme Court disagreed and instead held the interdistrict school desegregation plan unconstitutional. The Court
reasoned that the suburban school districts were autonomous
entities separate from the City of Detroit school district." Before
an inter-district remedy could be ordered, the Court found that
the plaintiffs would first need to show that the suburban school
districts engaged in de jure segregative practices that produced a
significant segregative effect in the City of Detroit school district.80 The Court concluded that "without an interdistrict violation
and interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for
an interdistrict remedy."'

73.
An in-depth discussion of the causes and consequence of white flight is beyond the
scope of the Article. For a more thorough discussion of white flight during the 1970s and
the implications for school desegregation, see ORFIELD & EATON, supra note 60, at 10-18.
74.
Milliken, 418 U.S. at 725, 739.
75.
Id. at 723-24.
76.
Id. at 725-35.
77.
Id. at 735 (quoting Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 245 (6th Cir. 1973) (en banc))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
78.
Id. at 736 (quoting Milliken, 484 F.2d at 249) (internal quotation marks omitted).
79.
Id. at 744-45.
80.
Id.
81.
Id. at 745.
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The standard articulated in Milliken invalidates any inter-district
school desegregation plan unless there is proof of an inter-district
violation-a very difficult standard that plaintiffs in only a handful
of cases have been able to meet." Milliken has been a devastating
setback for school desegregation efforts. By making an inter-district
violation a constitutional requirement for the implementation of
an inter-district remedy, the Court treated school district boundary
lines as sacrosanct rather than the administrative creations of the
state that they actually are."' Indeed, the Court recognized the administrative mutability of school district boundary lines in earlier
cases. 84 Similar to the Court's embrace of local control in Rodriguez,
the Court in Milliken favored local control-in this instance, local
control of school district boundary lines-at the expense of implementing a meaningful school desegregation plan to remedy a
constitutional violation. The Court bristled at the suggestion that
school district boundary lines should be disturbed in order to remedy de jure segregation; the Court noted:
Boundary lines may be bridged where there has been a constitutional violation calling for interdistrict relief, but the notion
that school district [boundary] lines may be casually ignored
or treated as a mere administrative convenience is contrary to
the history of public education in our country. No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local
See, e.g., United States v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'r, 456 F. Supp. 183, 191-92 (S.D. Ind.
82.
1978) (finding that inter-district desegregation order was warranted due to housing discrimination), af'd in part, rev'd in part, vacated in part, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1980), and cert.
denied, Metro. Sch. Dist. v. Buckley, 449 U.S. 838 (1980); Evans v. Buchanan, 416 F. Supp.
328, 352-53 (D. Del. 1976) (approving inter-district desegregation remedy due to government manipulation of enrollment patterns); see also Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 305-06
(1976) (ordering inter-district remedy in housing discrimination case).
See, e.g., Kevin Brown, Termination of Public School Desegregation:Determinationof Uni83.
tary Status Based on the Eliminationof Invidious Value Calculation,58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1105,
1134 (1990) (noting that the majority in Milliken erred by not finding that "the Detroit
Board of Education was an agency of the state of Michigan" and that the Board's "acts of
racial discrimination could be considered those of the state of Michigan for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment"); Mark C. Rahdert, Obstacles and Wrong Turns on the Road from
Brown: Milliken v. Bradley and the Quest for Racial Diversity in Education, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
Rrs. L. REV. 785, 798 (2004) (arguing that the Milliken majority wrongly characterized the
local school districts and the State of Michigan as if they were constitutionally distinct entities and noting that "[i]t is elementary that in our constitutional structure cities and local
school boards derive their authority from the state").
See, e.g., Sailors v. Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 108 (1967) (characterizing general
84.
local governments as "convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers
of the State as may be entrusted to them, and the number, nature and duration of the powers conferred upon [them] . . . and the territory over which they shall be exercised rest[ing]
in the absolute discretion of the State" (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Hunter v.
City of Pittsburgh,207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907))).

642

University of MichiganJournalof Law Reform

[VOL. 44:3

control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has
long been thought essential both to the maintenance of
community concern and support for public schools and to the
5
quality of the education process.
Milliken elevated the status of school district boundary lines in
the name of "local control." In so doing, the case changed the doctrinal landscape of the Court's school desegregation jurisprudence.
Given the realities of segregation in residential housing, there
simply are not enough white students in urban school districts nor
are there enough minority students in suburban school districts to
achieve meaningful desegregation. Milliken also arguably encourages whites seeking to avoid integrated education to move to the
suburbs. As noted by other scholars, if Milliken had come out differently, a major incentive for moving to the suburbs would have
been eliminated." In sum, Milliken poses a nearly insurmountable
barrier to effective desegregation insofar as it effectively immunizes
suburban school districts from scrutiny under the Fourteenth
Amendment and encourages whites seeking to avoid integrated
education to move to the suburbs.
D. After Rodriguez and Milliken: Localism as
a Near ConstitutionalNorm
Rodriguez and Milliken ushered in a new era in the Court's analysis of the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment in school
desegregation cases. Together, the cases elevated localism in education to a near constitutional norm. For example, a trio of cases in
the 1990s tested the stability of the norm, and all came out reaffirming it." In each case, the Court wrestled with the standard
under which school districts that were subject to school desegregation decrees could be considered to have achieved "unitary" status8
and therefore released from federal court supervision."9 For the
85.
Milliken, 411 U.S. at 741-42.
86.
See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public Education, 81 N.C. L. REv. 1598, 1605-09 (2003) (discussing the move of white families to
suburban areas and the resulting segregation of public schools).
87.
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992); Bd.
of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
88.
See Freeman, 503 U.S. 467. The term "unitary status" means that the school district
has eliminated the old racially segregated dual school system. Seven factors are measured to
determine if a school district has achieved unitary status. These factors are: extracurricular
activities; transportation; administrative staff assignment; relative quality of education; faculty assignment and student assignment.
89.
SeeJenkins, 515 U.S. 70; Freeman,503 U.S. 467; Dowell, 498 U.S. 237.
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most part, the Supreme Court opted to impose broad and arguably
vague standards that afforded school districts the opportunity to
terminate school desegregation decrees, even though termination
of the decrees would return these school districts to hypersegregated conditions. For example, in Board of Education v. Dowell,
the Court held that a school district need only show that it "complied in good faith with the desegregation decree since it was
entered" and that "the vestiges of past discrimination have been
eliminated to the extent practicable"90 in order to be released from
a federal court school desegregation decree. Prior to the Court's
ruling in Dowell, school districts might not be released from school
desegregation decrees if releasing them would have the foreseeable impact of restoring segregated conditions within a school
district.91 After Dowell, however, school districts could free themselves from federal court supervision so long as they made a good
faith effort "to the extent practicable" to eliminate vestiges of discrimination, even if releasing the school districts would result in
foreseeable segregation.
In Freeman v. Pitts, the Court further weakened the strength of
federal court control over school desegregation by finding that
federal district courts have the authority to release school districts
from school desegregation decrees in incremental stages, before
the school district has achieved unitary status or eliminated vestiges
of segregation in all areas of school operations." Finally, in Missouri
v. Jenkins, the Court ordered an end to successful court-ordered
desegregation plans once unitary school systems were achieved,
even if termination of the court-ordered school desegregation
plans would return the schools to extreme levels of segregation.
Notably, in Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins, the Court emphasized
that principles of federalism necessitated that federal supervision
of local schools be a temporary measure and that local control of
schools be returned as soon as possible. The Court further emphasized that school districts were not responsible for remedying
90.
Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249-50.
See Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Toward a Pragmatic Understandingof Status-Consciousness:
91.
The Case of Deregulated Education, 50 DuKE L.J. 753, 794-95 (2000) (noting Supreme Court
cases prior to Dowell holding that proof of foreseeable segregative consequences of state
action is relevant to demonstrating a racially discriminatory purpose and authorities' failure
to eradicate prior discrimination).
See Freeman, 503 U.S. at 492-93.
92.
See jenkins, 515 U.S. 70.
93.
See id. at 102 (emphasizing that the goal of desegregation remedies is to "'remedy
94.
the violation' to the extent practicable, but also 'to restore state and local authorities to the
control of a school system that is operating in compliance with the Constitution'" (quoting
Freeman, 503 U.S. at 489)); Dowell, 498 U.S. at 247 ("[Federal supervision of local school
systems was intended as a temporary measure to remedy past discrimination.").
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racial imbalance attributable to factors outside of the school district's control, such as demographic change and parental school
preference.5 Because the Court has so freely embraced localism,
defendant school districts have enjoyed significant latitude to exer96
cise control over the school desegregation remedial process.
Indeed, since the Court's decisions in Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins,
school districts have been released from school desegregation decrees in overwhelming numbers and more often than not win
challenges to segregated school conditions brought by minority
parents and students. 97
There are two noteworthy implications of the Court ceding such
control to defendant school districts in the name of local control.
First, from a constitutional perspective, the Fourteenth Amendment Brown I right of minority children to attend non-segregated
schools has arguably been subjugated to the American value preference for "local control" over schools. By insisting that federal
court supervision over school desegregation plans was always intended to be a temporal measure and further insisting that school
districts are not to be held accountable for factors beyond their
control such as demographic changes, the Court forecloses the
possibility of any effective judicially created remedy for school segregation. Second, by imposing a minimal "good faith" requirement
on school districts to "remedy vestiges of discrimination to the extent practicable"98 in order to escape federal court supervision, the
Court implicitly provides safe harbor for school districts to avoid
continued participation in school desegregation plans.

III.

MODERN DAY

SCHOOL SEGREGATION: GEOGRAPHY,
RACE, AND

CLASS

The consequences of the federal judiciary's preference for localism in its school equity jurisprudence cannot be overstated.
Because students for the most part attend schools in close proximiSee, e.g., Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 117 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("District courts must not
95.
confuse the consequences of de jure segregation with the results of larger social forces ....
'It is simply not always the case that demographic forces causing population change bear any
real and substantial relation to a dejureviolation.'" (quoting Freeman, 503 U.S. at 496)).
96.
See Wendy Parker, Connecting the Dots: Grutter, School Desegregation, and Federalism,
45 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 1691, 1731-39 (2004) (arguing that defendants are afforded too
much deference and control over the school desegregation remedial process in the name of
local control).
97.
See Wendy Parker, The Decline ofjudicialDecisionmaking: School Desegregation and District CourtJudges, 81 N.C. L. REv. 1623, 1629-34 (2003).
98. Dowel, 498 U.S. at 249-50.
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ty to the neighborhoods in which they live, the true ramifications
of the Court's embrace of localism can only be understood within
the larger context of residential housing segregation and the federal, state, and local laws that perpetuate such segregation.
A. Segregation by Geography: SegregatedNeighborhoods
and Segregated Schools
One important factor that differentiates school segregation today from school segregation pre-Brown is geography. Today,
inequalities in education mirror the stark inequalities between urban and suburban schools. Schools in urban cities and inner-ring
suburbs typically lag far behind their suburban counterparts in
measures of academic achievement and traditionally boast fewer
teaching resources.' The academic achievement and resource gap
between urban and suburban schools is neither accidental nor coincidental. Rather, as discussed further in Part ILB infra, it is the
result of state and local government laws that encourage affluent
and typically white residents to migrate away from poor and typically minority residents.
The long and sordid history of residential segregation has been
discussed at great length by other scholars and need not be recounted in great detail here. 00 Nevertheless, it is worth briefly
describing how intense residential segregation in metropolitan areas leads to segregation in schools.
Residential segregation typically tracks the boundary lines between cities and suburbs. According to the 2000 U.S. Census
Bureau report, approximately 77% of individuals who lived in a
metropolitan suburb were white while only 23% belonged to a minority group.'0 ' Residential segregation then replicates itself in
schools because school district boundary lines are typically drawn

99.
See, e.g., MARGARET C. WANG &JOHN A. KOVACH, BRIDGING THE ACHIEVEMENT
GAP IN URBAN SCHOOLS: REDUCING EDUCATIONAL SEGREGATION AND ADVANCING RESILIENCE-PROMISING STRATEGIES 3-4 (1995) (describing one of the side effects of residential
segregation being that African-American and other minority students get segregated in
schools where academic achievement is low and resources such as qualified teachers and
textbooks are nonexistent).
100. See, e.g., DOUGLAS S.

MASSEY& NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 130-42 (1993) (arguing that residential
segregation is the principal factor responsible for the creation of the urban underclass).
101. See 2000 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, PROFILES OF GENERAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/
dpl/2khus.pdf (noting that of the minority population in the suburbs 8% are Black, 11%
Latino, and 3% Asian).
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coterminous with political subdivisions. Demographic enrollment
data from the 2006-2007 school-year bears this out:
TABLE

1

DISTRIBUTION OF ENROLLMENT BY SCHOOL DISTRICT LOCATION

(% SHARE

Suburban

Enrlnt
Enrollment

OF SUBURBAN ENROLLMENT)

10 2

White

Black

Latino

Asian

59%

15%

20%

6%

TABLE

2

DISTRIBUTION OF ENROLLMENT BY SCHOOL DISTRICT LOCATION
(% SHARE CHILDREN EDUCATED BY URBAN SCHOOLS BY RACE)'o

Urban
nrlnt

Enrollment

White

Black

Latino

Asian

19%

48%

47%

47%

As predicted by residential housing patterns, Table 1 shows that
white students make up the majority (59%) of students enrolled in
suburban schools while Black, Latino, and Asian students make up
a much smaller percentage. In contrast, Table 2 shows that only
19% of all white students are enrolled in urban schools while nearly half of all Black, Latino, or Asian students (48%, 47%, and 47%
respectively) are enrolled in urban schools. These statistics are
troubling. Because urban schools usually have inferior resources
and score lower on academic achievement levels,o4 the segregation
of white students into suburban schools and minority students into
urban schools runs counter to Brown's promise of equal educational opportunity for all students, regardless of race.

B. Racial and Economic Segregation in Schools: Why It Matters
Schools with high concentrations of poor students also enroll a
high percentage of minority students. For example, during the
2005-2006 school-year, the average Black or Latino student attend102. RICHARD FRY, PEw HISPANIC CENTER, THE RAPID GROWTH AND CHANGING COMPLEXION OF SUBURBAN PUBLIC SCHOOLs 3 (2009), availableat http://pewhispanic.org/files/
reports/105.pdf.

103.
104.

Id. at 4.
See Section III.B infra.
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ed a school in which 59% of his or her peers was classified as
"poor" while only 31% of the average white student's peers was
In addition, school districts with large perclassified as poor.'
centages of students classified as "extremely poor"o' also have a
disproportionately high percentage of Black and Latino students.' 0 7 Thus, schools that are segregated by race are also typically
segregated by poverty as well.
The combination of racial and economic segregation in schools
presents a series of significant barriers to providing students with a
high-quality education. First, poor students often face significant
challenges in their home environments: poor health, malnutrition,
neighborhood violence, and unstable family situations, which can
all serve as serious impediments to student attendance and learning.0 5 As a result, they are more likely to miss out on the various
informal education and socialization opportunities that researchers have identified as just as important to making students "school
ready."'09 Poor minority students also often face pressure from their
peers to not succeed academically because achievement is otherwise equated with "acting white.'""o

105.

See GARY

ORFIELD

&

CHUNGMEI LEE, CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HISTORIC REVERSALS,

ACCELERATING RESEGREGATION,

AND

THE NEED FOR NEW INTEGRATION STRATEGIES 19

(2007), availableat http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED500611 .pdf. The report defines "poor"
as students qualifying for free or reduced lunch under federal poverty guidelines. Id. at 20.
106. See STEVE Surrrs, THE WORST OF TIMES: CHILDREN IN EXTREME POVERTY IN THE
SOUTH AND THE NATION 15 (2010), available at http://www.southerneducation.org/pdf/
TWOT-Extreme%2OChild%2OPoverty%20Rpt-Final.pdf (defining "extremely poor" as a
family that subsists on half the amount of the federal poverty line or approximately $11,000
a year for a family of four).
107. Id. ("African American (43.4 percent) and Hispanic (34.4 percent) students make
up 78 percent of the total enrollment of the 100 school districts in the United States with
the highest levels of extremely poor children-districts where at least two children out of
every 10 live in extreme poverty.").
108. See Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417, 433 (N.J. 1997) (finding that in poor, predominately minority schools, "obstacles to a thorough and efficient education are present
not only in the schools themselves, but also in the neighborhoods and family conditions
of poor urban children ... [including] drug abuse, crime, hunger, poor health, illness,
and unstable family situations"); GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, WHY SEGREGATION MATTERS: POVERTY AND EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY 15 (2005),
available at http://bsdweb.bsdvt.org/district/EquityExcellence/Research/Why-SegregMatters.pdf (finding that poor communities "reflect conditions of distress-housing inadequacy and decay, weak and failing infrastructure, and critical lack of mentors and
shortage of jobs-all of which adversely affect inner city children's educational success").
109. See, e.g., Suirrs, supra note 106, at 18-19 (noting that "poor children hear and
learn on average about one-third to one-half the number of spoken English words that nonpoor children learn simply through exposure in their early years" which contributes to them
being less ready to begin school than non-poor students).
110. Signithia Fordham & John U. Ogbu, Black Students' School Success: Coping with the
"Burdenof 'Acting White,'" 18 URB. REV. 176, 181 (1986).
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Given the myriad of obstacles faced by schools with high percentages of socio-economically disadvantaged and minority
students, one would think that these schools must spend a
premium to compensate by providing additional academic and
non-academic support programs."' However, these schools typically
spend significantly less money per-pupil than school districts with
lower poverty rates, even when one accounts for federal grant
money given to schools with large percentages of poor students."
Consequently, they are more likely to have teachers who are not
credentialed in the subject areas in which they teach, offer fewer
honors or advanced placement courses, and have high teacher
turnover rates."'3 Predictably, students who attend such schools
score lower on standardized achievement tests and are more likely
to drop out."4
Simply put, a significant number of students who attend predominantly poor and minority schools receive lesser access to
adequate educational resources and have lower academic
achievement than their white and more affluent peers. The U.S.
school age population is becoming increasingly racially diverse and
is projected to be nearly 40% Black, Latino, or Asian-American by
2030."' If the growing number of minority students, particularly
Black and Latino students, do not receive access to adequate educational resources and improved academic achievement, the
United States could see a significant decrease in the wage earning
potential of its citizens along with a loss of significant tax reve-

111. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 24, at 285 (concluding that "schools with large concentrations of impoverished students will face the greatest educational costs, even before factoring
in such additional services as security or counseling, and even without considering the different prices for educational goods and services in cities as opposed to suburbs or rural
areas").
112. See Sunrrs, supra note 106, at 16; Cassandra Jones Havard, Funny Money: How Federal Education FundingHurts Poorand Minority Students, 19 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 123
(2009) (arguing that the Title I federal funding regime has become a source of inequity in
educational services for students in high-poverty schools because it allows for discretion in
the allocation of federal monies).
113. See Brief of 553 Social Scientists as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 30,
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (Nos. 05-908 &
05-915), 2006 WL 2927079; GARY ORFIELD, CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, SCHOOLS MoRE SEPARATE: CONSEQUENCES OF A DECADE OF RESEGREGATION 10-11 (2001), available at
http://eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED459217.pdf.
114. Brief of 553 Social Scientists as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra
note 113, at 30.
115. See Marta Tienda & Sigal Alon, Diversity and the DemographicDividend:Achieving Educational Equity in an Aging White Society, in THE PRICE WE PAY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES OF INADEQUATE EDUCATION 48, 50-58 (Clive R. Belfield & Henry M. Levin
eds., 2007) (describing demographic changes in school aged children in the United States).
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nue."G Failure to provide the growing number of minority students
with adequate educational resources and improved academic
achievement may also result in an increase in crime and incarceration rates in the United States."' Thus, the costs of continuing to
maintain segregated schools and failing to properly educate poor
and minority students will be borne not only by the individual students but also by society as a whole.
C. Government PoliciesExacerbateRace and
Class Segregation in Schools
Federal, state, and local government policies are complicit in
fostering race and class-based residential segregation. As discussed
in Part II supra, the Supreme Court's remedial school desegregation jurisprudence places the problem of school segregation
caused by residential segregation outside the purview of the federal courts' remedial powers. The underlying rationale behind the
Court's reasoning appears to be that residential segregation is a
matter of private choice rather than intentional state action."' This
Section argues the opposite.
Federal, state, and local government policies all play a pivotal
role in creating racial and economic segregation among urban and
suburban communities. With respect to federal government policies, after World War II, mortgage insurance programs were
established through the Federal Housing Administration that enabled and encouraged middle-class white families to obtain
financing for new housing outside core central cities in burgeoning suburbs.'19 At the same time, the Federal Housing
Administration maintained underwriting policies that discouraged
116. See Cecilia Elena Rouse, Consequencesfor the Labor Market, in THE PRICE WE PAY, Supra note 115, at 99 (finding that in 2005 high school drop outs earned thirty-seven cents for
every dollar earned by someone with a high school diploma or more and that such individuals reduced the overall U.S. tax-base).
117. See Enrico Moretti, Crime and the Costs of CriminalJustice,in THE PRICE WE PAY Supra
note 115, at 142 (describing the ways in which educational attainment affects crime and
incarceration rates).
118. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 495 (1992) (noting that segregation in the
school context is often "a product not of state action but of private choices" and further
concluding that "[r]esidential housing choices, and their attendant effects on the racial
composition of schools, present an ever-changing pattern, one difficult to address through
judicial remedies").
119. See, e.g., Roberta Achtenberg, Keynote Address at the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review Symposium: Shaping American Communities-Segregation, Housing & the
Urban Poor, in 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1191, 1193 (1995) (describing how FHA programs benefited white citizens in financing suburban homes).
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minorities from buying homes in areas outside of the decaying
central city."2
In fact, the Federal Housing Administration's policies limited
the ability of minorities to participate in the overall homeownership bonanza that occurred after World War II as "less than 2
percent of the housing financed with federal mortgage assistance
from 1946 to 1959 was available to [Blacks] .,,12' To be sure, because
the Federal Housing Administration was "deeply committed to financing housing in the suburbs and not [cities]," the federal
government played a pivotal role in excluding minorities, particularly Blacks, from residing in the suburbs. 2 2 The federal
government's transportation policies also compounded the problem by subsidizing highways that allowed whites to live in the
suburbs while working in central cities.'2 3 Together, the FHA's racially discriminatory lending practices and the proliferation of
federally subsidized highways served to relegate minorities to decaying urban cities while helping to populate suburban enclaves
with white citizens.
State and local government policies are similarly culpable in
creating and maintaining residential segregation. Many states delegate broad powers to localities that allow them to separate from
predominantly poor and minority central cities. As Professor Frug
notes, these powers include, among others, the right to incorporate as separate municipalities, the right to zone, and immunity
from annexation by the central city.'24 The exercise of these powers
typically leads to the proliferation of several separate political subdivisions located adjacent to a larger central city. This
phenomenon, popularly known as "urban sprawl," usually leads to
poor and minority residents being concentrated in the central city
while more affluent whites locate in the suburbs. 2" This is because
suburban localities often use land exclusionary zoning mechanisms
that prevent poorer populations, usually minorities, from living in
120. See, e.g., Florence Wagman Roisman, TeachingAbout Inequality, Race, and Propery,46
ST. Louis U. L.J. 665, 677-78 (2002) ("The FHA Underwriting Manual specifically instructed that the presence of 'inharmonious racial or nationality groups' made a neighborhood's
housing undesirable for insurance. The Underwriting Manual explicitly recommended
racially restrictive covenants, and warned: 'If a neighborhood is to retain stability, it is necessary that properties shall continue to be occupied by the same social and racial classes
. . . ."(quoting Kenneth T. Jackson, CrabgrassFrontier: The Suburbanizationof the United States,
in A PROPERTY ANTHOLOGY 208 (Richard H. Chused ed., 2d ed. 1997))).
121. Id. at 681 (citing MARK I. GEFLAND, A NATION OF CITIES: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND URBAN AMERICA 1933-1965, at 221 (1975)).
122. Id.
123. See MASSEY & DENTON, supranote 100, at 44-45.
124. SeeJerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047, 1070 (1996).
125. See Orfield, supra note 23, at 877-78.
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their localities.' Examples of such exclusionary zoning tactics include: capping the number of affordable housing units that can be
built in a locality, requiring large lots and floor plans to prevent
affordable housing from being built at all, or prohibiting multifamily residences from being built.2 7
The federal judiciary's doctrinal stance of treating residential
segregation as a consequence of private choice is simply wrong. By
treating school and neighborhood segregation as separate phenomena, the Court blindly denies that federal, state, and local
government policies are root causes of residential neighborhood
segregation. Furthermore, by embracing localism in its school equity jurisprudence at the expense of providing poor and minority
students equal educational opportunities, the Court has made it
extremely hard for the judiciary to craft school desegregation remedies.
D. Utilizinga New RegionalistApproach to FightingRacial and Economic
SegregationBetween School Districts:An Examplefrom the
FHA "Affirmatively Furthering"Language
The term "New Regionalism" means utilizing cooperation
among localities to solve problems in ways that are attentive to the
interests of all neighboring localities rather than the interests of a
single locality.'" In the fair housing context, policymakers are experimenting with new regionalist solutions to combat racial and
economic segregation in housing. In particular, Section 808(d) of
the FHA provides that the Housing Urban Development ("HUD")
Secretary must "administer ... programs and activities relating to

housing and urban development in a manner affirmatively to further
the policies of this [Act]."2 Cases interpreting this statutory provision have found that it imposes on HUD an obligation and an
affirmative duty to do more than just provide discrimination-free
housing.'30
126. Id. at 878.
127. See, e.g., S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 729
(N.J. 1975) (discussing land use and zoning policies used by the Mount Laurel Township to
exclude low-income residents from residing in Mount Laurel).
128. See Briffault, supra note 21; Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal Bargains,76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 190 (2001).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e) (5) (2006) (emphasis added).
130. See, e.g., NAACP v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 155 (1st Cir. 1987)
("HUD [has] an obligation to do more than simply refrain from discriminating (and from
purposely aiding discrimination by others)."); Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d
1122, 1125 (2d Cir. 1973) ("[HUD] is obligated to take affirmative steps to promote racial
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Significantly, in light of demographic changes that have wrought
high levels of residential segregation with minorities populating
inner cities and inner-ring suburbs and whites populating outerring suburbs, courts interpreting HUD's duty under Section
808(d) have found that the affirmative duty includes the duty to
"consider regionally-oriented desegregation and integration policies."'
For example, in Hills v. Gautreaux, the Supreme Court allowed
HUD to remedy intentional public housing segregation in the City
of Chicago by providing housing opportunities in the greater metropolitan Chicago suburbs. 32 In finding that a remedy involving
the greater metropolitan suburbs rather than just the City of Chicago was appropriate, the Court distinguished Milliken (which
rejected the propriety of a metropolitan school desegregation
remedy) on the grounds that "a metropolitan area remedy involving HUD need not displace the rights and powers accorded subursuburban governmental entities under federal or state law."'33 The
Court reasoned that
local housing authorities and municipal governments [have]
to make application for funds or approve the use of funds in
the locality before HUD could make housing assistance available. An order directed solely to HUD would not force
unwilling localities to apply for assistance under these programs but would merely reinforce the regulations guiding HUD's
determination of which of the locally authorized projects to assist with

federalfunds.1
The Court further noted that in allowing for a metropolitan
remedy, it would allow HUD to comply with its statutory duty "affirmatively to further" fair housing. 1
Similarly, in Thompson v. HUD, the U.S. District Court for Maryland found that HUD violated its statutory duty to "affirmatively
further fair housing" by failing to "consider regionally-oriented desegregation and integration policies."'" More specifically, the
Court found that HUD focused its desegregation efforts almost
integration even though this may in some instances not operate to the immediate advantage
of some non-white persons.").
131. See, e.g., Thompson v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 348 F. Supp. 2d 398, 409
(D. Md. 2005).

132.

425 U.S. 284, 302-06 (1976).

133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 298 n.13.
Id. at 303 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Id. at 302; see also 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e) (5) (2006).
Thompson, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 409.
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exclusively on building and demolishing public housing units within the City of Baltimore.3 Notably, the Court emphasized that
"Section 3608 [of the FHA] imposes upon Defendants an 'affirmative' obligation; it requires Defendants to do something 'more than
simply refrain from discriminating themselves or from purposely
aiding discrimination by others.""3 " Because HUD failed to consider regional solutions to aid public housing desegregation,
particularly options in the counties surrounding Baltimore, the
Court concluded that HUD had violated Section 808(d) of the
FHA. 39
As an outgrowth of the Gautreaux and Thompson cases, two notable housing mobility programs, the Gautreaux Program and the
Baltimore Housing Mobility Program ("BHM") were created. The
Gautreaux program allowed low-income public housing residents
in Chicago to receive a subsidy in the form of a voucher that they
could use in the private rental market to move to predominantly
white residential areas in the City of Chicago or in the suburbs.'40
The program was widely considered a success as participants in the
program experienced increased employment opportunities, access
to better schools, and an improved overall quality of life. 4 1
Similarly, the BHM program also provides current and former
public housing residents on the public housing or the Housing
Choice Voucher waiting lists "access to private market housing in
low poverty and predominantly white neighborhoods." 4 2 Although
the BHM program was only recently launched in 2003, early research indicates that the program has been successful in improving
housing stability, access to quality schools, and overall quality of life
for program participants. 4 3
Gautreaux and Thompson recognized that regional solutions to
housing are sometimes the only way to achieve meaningful residential . integration. The success of the Gautreaux and BHM
programs suggest that the concept of enabling mobility in order to
obtain full access to high opportunity areas in both the suburbs
137. Id. at 463.
138. Id. at 416 (quoting NAACP v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 155 (1st
Cir. 1987)).
139. Id. at 443.
140. See James E. Rosenbaum & Stefanie DeLuca, What Kinds of Neighborhoods Change
Lives? The Chicago Gautreaux Program and Recent Mobility Programs, 41 IND. L. REv. 653, 65455 (2008) (describing the Gautreauxprogram).
141. Id. at 656-59.
142. LORA ENGHDAL, NEW HosES, NEW NEIGHBORHOODS, NEW SCHOOLS: A PROGRESS
REPORT ON THE BALTIMORE HOUSING MOBILITY PROGRAM 2 (2009), available at http://
www.prrac.org/pdf/BaltimoreMobilityReport.pdf.
143. Id. at 3.

University of MichiganJournalof Law Reform

654

[VOL. 44:3

and city should be emulated in a wide variety of government programs, including the provision of education.
IV.

THE

NCLB

PUBLIC CHOICE PROVISION: LEVELING LOCALISM

AND SCHOOL DISTRICT BOUNDARY LINES THROUGH
INTER-DISTRICT CHOICE

As discussed above, gross disparities in educational resources between school districts make it difficult for states to provide quality
education to all children. Simply put, "[1] iving on one side of a district boundary line or the other can dictate whether a student has
access to challenging curriculum, well-prepared teachers, decent
facilities, high expectations, non-poor peers, and a wealth of other
tangible and intangible factors that influence learning."" NCLB
attempts to alleviate such disparities by requiring schools to ensure
equitable outcomes at a basic level of educational achievement for
students of all races and socio-economic backgrounds.1 4 5 It employs
a cooperative federalism model in which states develop and manage their own accountability programs approved by the
Department of Education, in return for Title I funding.'4 r
By increasing the role of the federal government in areas of education policy that have been traditionally regulated by state and
local governments, NCLB is often criticized as an impermissible
impairment to traditional notions of educational federalism.
However, because educational achievement continues to be a national priority, federal involvement in academic achievement and
accountability is likely to continue."' Furthermore, because most
states receive and rely on significant amounts of Title I funding,49
it is unlikely that any state will decide to opt out of receiving Title I
WELLS ET AL., supra note 14, at 1.
145. See 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b) (2) (2006).
146. See generally id. § 6311 (setting forth the process by which states develop accountability and curriculum plans that must be approved by the Department of Education in
return for Title I funds).
147. See Michael Heise, The PoliticalEconomy of EducationalFederalism,56 EMORY L.J. 125,
127 (2006) (discussing traditional concepts of federalism in education and how NCLB challenged the federalism status quo in education).
148. See Kamina Aliya Pinder, FederalDemand and Local Choice: Safeguarding the Notion of
Federalism in Education Law and Policy, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 26-35 (2010) (discussing the appropriate role of federal and state laws in creating and enforcing laws related to academic
achievement and concluding that the federal government should play an important and
substantial role).
149. See U.S. GEN. AccouNTING OFFICE, TITLE I PRESCHOOL EDUCATION: MORE CHILDREN SERVED, BUT GAUGING EFFECT ON SCHOOL READINESS DIFFIcuLT 5 (2000), available at
144.

http://gao.gov/new.items/he00171.pdf

Title I funding).

(noting that 90% of public schools receive some

SPRING

2011 ]

Leveling Localism and Racial Inequality

655

funding in order to avoid complying with the conditions attached
to receiving Title I funding.15 0
Consequently, this Part argues that although NCLB has undoubtedly expanded the role of the federal government in
education in an attempt to alleviate race and class-based educational disparities, 5 1 the Act could do more to lessen the impact that
school district boundary lines play in determining educational outcomes for students. This could be done by taking advantage of the
fiscal inability of most states to opt out of receiving Title I funding
and amending the NCLB public choice provision to include language that facilitates inter-district transfers, similar to the
"affirmatively furthering fair housing" language used under the

FHA.152
This Part provides a brief overview of how the federal government's role in education originated and evolved through the
Elementary Secondary Education Act ("ESEA"). It then analyzes
the most recent version of the ESEA-NCLB and argues that when
the ESEA is reauthorized in 2012, the public choice provision
should be amended to encourage inter-district transfers.
A. The Role of the Federal Government in Education Through
the ESEA: From Cooperation to Coercion
1. History of Federal Government Involvement in
Education Through the ESEA: 1965-2000
Throughout most of American history, the federal government
has played a minimal role in the provision of education. The most
extensive involvement in the provision of education by the federal
government came in 1965 when Congress passed the ESEA as part
of President Lyndon B. Johnson's efforts to end poverty. 5 3 ESEA's
150. Some states have threatened to forego NCLB funding due to their displeasure with
the Act's accountability scheme and a lack of federal funding to adequately comply with it.
Indeed, Utah and Virginia went as far as passing resolutions and proposed legislation that
would have had the states opting out of receipt of Tide I spending. However, when faced
with the reality of how much federal revenue they would lose if they opted out, both states
declined to do so. See Note, No Child Left Behind and the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 119
HARV. L. REv. 885, 897-900 (2006).
151. See 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006). The Act notes that its statement of purpose could be
accomplished "closing the achievement gap between high- and low-performing children,
especially the achievement gaps between minority and nonminority students, and between
disadvantaged children and their more advantaged peers." Id. 6301(3).
152. See supra Section III.D.
153. See Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat.
27 (1965) (amended and reauthorized as NCLB in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. in 2002).
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original purpose was to improve America's elementary and secondary schools by providing states with funding to meet the
educational needs of poor children. 5 4 Notably, although the original purpose of the Act was to assist all poor children, one of the
key goals of the Act was to address the deteriorating conditions of
inner-city schools, which contained high numbers of poor Black
children."' By addressing educational inadequacies among the
poor, particularly the Black poor, the Johnson administration
hoped to boost that group's economic and social mobility.
The ESEA consists of five titles: Title I provides funding to
schools serving children from low-income families; Title II provides
schools with money to purchase library books and other instructional material; Title III provides funding for services to "at risk"
children including after school programs; Title IV provides funding for college and university research on education; and Title V
provides funding to individual state departments of education.'
Title I is by far the most significant part of the ESEA. Title I distributes federal money to local school districts according to the
number of poor students in the school district. School districts in
which at least ten children and 2% of the overall student population are classified as poor are eligible to receive Title I funding. 58
Given this low threshold, "almost all school districts, even very affluent school districts," receive some Title I funds.'5 9 School
districts with predominantly minority populations have high percentages of students classified as living poor and therefore receive
larger amounts of Title I funding.'6o
154. See id. § 205(a)(1); see also S. REP. No. 146, at 4 (1965) ("The solution to these
problems [of American education] lies in the ability of our local elementary and secondary
school systems to provide full opportunity for a high quality program of instruction in the
basic educational skills because of the strong correlation between educational underachievement and poverty.").
155. SeeJULIE Roy JEFFREY, EDUCATION FOR CHILDREN OF THE POOR: A STUDY OF THE
ORIGINS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT OF

1965, at 29-30, 65 (1978) (discussing the planning of the ESEA and the Kennedy andJohnson administrations' desire to focus any comprehensive federal education legislation on
young Blacks on the theory that education offered hope for economic improvement
amongst this group).
156. Id. at 30-31.
157. Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 79 Stat. 27; JEFFREY, supra note 155, at
77-78.
158. Improving Basic Programs Operated by Local EducationalAgencies (Title I. Part A), U.S.
DEP'T OF EDUC., http://www.ed.gov/programs/titleiparta/index.html (last modified Jan.
27, 2010).
159. See No Child Left Behind Act-Title I Distribution Formulas, FEDERAL EDUCATION
BUDGET

PROJECT,

http://febp.newamerica.net/background-analysis/no-child-left-behind-

act-title-i-distribution-formulas (last visited Mar. 9, 2011).
160. See DIANE M. PICHE ET AL., TITLE I IN MIDSTREAM: THE FIGHT TO IMPROVE
SCHOOLS FOR POOR KIDS 1-3 (Corrine M. Yu & William L. Taylor eds., 1999) (quoting
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Between 1965 and 1994, Congress reauthorized the ESEA several times. In each reauthorization, Congress placed only minimal
conditions on the receipt of funding under the Act.'6 ' However, in
1994, when Congress reauthorized the ESEA as the Improving
America's Schools Act ("LASA"), Congress shifted to a standardsbased reform approach. "The purpose of the IASA was 'to enable
schools to provide opportunities for children served to acquire the
knowledge and skills contained in challenging State content standards . ... '6

As a precursor to NCLB, IASA required all school

districts to identify schools that were not making Adequate Yearly
Progress ("AYP"). Significantly, however, IASA did not impose financial penalties or otherwise sanction schools that were not
making AYP.16 Instead, IASA only required school districts to
demonstrate that formal steps were being taken to improve schools
that were not making AYP.
2. NCLB: Expanding the Role of the Federal
Government in Education
ESEA's influence on education policy increased exponentially in
2001 when Congress reauthorized it as the No Child Left Behind
Act. It dramatically changed the balance of power between the
federal and state government in the provision of education. For
the first time in the history of the ESEA, to achieve its stated goal
of "ensur[ing] that all children have a fair, equal and significant
opportunity to obtain a high-quality education,"6 NCLB requires
schools to comply with rigorous teaching, testing, and accountability schemes as a condition for receiving Title I funds. 6 6 More
specifically, the Act requires public schools to annually test
MICHAEL J. PUMA ET AL., PROSPECTS: THE CONGRESSIONALLY MANDATED STUDY OF EDUCATIONAL GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITY-INTERIM REPORT 18 (1993)), available at http://
www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED438372.pdf. Admittedly however, the Title I funding scheme has
come under attack recently for being a source of inequity in educational services for students in high-poverty schools. See, e.g., Havard, supranote 112, at 125 ("Because it allows for
discretion in the allocation of federal monies, Title I federal funding regime has become a
source of inequity in educational services for students in high-poverty schools.").
161. SeeJanet Y. Thomas & Kevin P. Brady, The Elementary and Secondary Education Act at
40: Equity, Accountability and the Evolving Federal Role in Public Education, 29 REv. OF RES. IN

EDuc. 51, 53, 63 (2005).
162.

Id. at 54-55 (quoting Improving America's Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-

382, 1001(d), 108 Stat. 3518).
163. See id. at 57.
164.

Id. at 55.

165.
166.

20 U.S.C. 6301 (2006).
See id. 6311(b)(1).
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students in math, reading, and science."" Each year, schools must
show steady improvement in standardized test results for every
grade and for multiple demographic groups, including minorities,
English language learners, and socio-economically disadvantaged
students. ie The results of the annual tests, along with other measurements such as attendance and graduation rates, are used to
determine whether a school is making AYP toward 100% proficiency for all students by the 2013-2014 school year.'6"
If a school that receives Title I funds fails to make AYP, the
school is identified as "in need of improvement.,",o Once a Tide I
school fails to make AYP for two consecutive years, the school enters "improvement status" and a series of remedies are afforded to
students attending the school, including the right to transfer to a
non-failing school or to take advantage of supplemental education
services such as tutoring for students who elect to remain at the
school. 7

B. The NCLB Public Choice Provision

1. Statutory Scheme
An important but often overlooked part of the NCLB statutory
scheme is the public choice remedy.' 2 In a concession to the time
and effort needed to reform schools that are not meeting NCLB's
AYP requirements, the public choice remedy requires schools in
"improvement status" or further along in the NCLB remedial
phase to offer students the opportunity to transfer to a betterperforming school. 73 In essence, the local school district is re167. Id.6311(b)(3)(A).
168. See id. § 6311(b)(2)(C)(v)(II). This lesser known, yet useful, component of NCLB
is the race and class-conscious accountability scheme contained in the Act. The accountability scheme requires schools to disaggregate student performance data into four subgroups
for purposes of determining whether a school has complied with the academic performance
requirements. The four subgroups are: "economically disadvantaged students"; "students
from major racial or ethnic groups"; "students with disabilities"; and "students with limited
English proficiency." Id. If any subgroup of a school fails to meet its AYP for two consecutive
years, the school is identified as a school in need of improvement and subject to sanctions.
See id. 6316(b) (1) (A). Thus, a school can be deemed in need of improvement and subject to
sanctions if the majority of students met the performance requirements but a single subgroup of students (e.g., socioeconomically disadvantaged students) fails to do so. See id.
§ 6311 (b) (2)(I).
169. See id. §§ 6311 (b) (2) (C) (vi-vii), 6316(b) (3) (A) (v).
170. See id.
6316(b) (1) (A).
171. Id. 6316 (b) (5) (1) (E) (i).
172. See id.
173. See id
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quired to provide each student attending a school that fails to
make AYP for two consecutive years with a choice of alternative
public schools (including charter schools) that are making adequate yearly progress to which the student can transfer.14
If there is more than one school within the school district to
which the student may transfer, the school district must provide
the parent with a choice of more than one school and take into
account the parent's preference in choosing a school.' In keeping
with the Act's mission of ensuring an adequate education for
disadvantaged students, school districts are required to give lowperforming students from low-income families priority in exercising the right to transfer. 7 6 Critically, school districts are only
required to offer the student an opportunity to transfer to a school
that has made AYP within the same school district. 7 7 If there are no
other eligible schools within the school district to which the student can transfer, the school district is encouraged "to the extent
practicable [to] establish a cooperative agreement" with nearby
school districts to accept transfers. 7 8 The school district may also
offer supplemental educational services or tutoring to eligible students if there are no other eligible schools to which the student
can transfer within the school district, but only if the school is in its
first year of "improvement status."' 7 9 The school district can under
no circumstances use "lack of capacity" or lack of eligible schools as
a basis for denying a student the opportunity to transfer to a betterperforming school.so
2. Obstacles to Effective Utilization of the
Public Choice Provision
Despite these statutory safeguards, designed to ensure that
students can take advantage of the transfer option, the public
choice provision remains under-utilized. A 2007 U.S. Department
of Education report analyzed the use of the public choice option in
nine large, urban districts and found that a mere 0.5% of the
students eligible to transfer to a higher-performing school actually

174.
175.
176.

Id.
34 C.F.R. § 200.44(a) (4) (i)-(ii) (2008).
See id. 200.44(e)(1)

177.

See 20 U.S.C. 6316 (b) (E)(1).

178.
179.
180.

34 C.F.R. 200.44(h) (1).
Id. 200.44(h) (2).
Id. 200.44(d).
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exercised this right."' Much criticism has been levied at school
districts for their ineffective implementation of the transfer
provision, particularly their failure to notify parents and students
of their right to transfer in time for the students to exercise the
transfer option. 8 2 The U.S. Department of Education, in an
attempt to remove these barriers, issued regulations in October
2008 requiring, among other things, schools to provide "timely and
clear" notification to parents and students of their rights to
transfer to a better-performing school.'
While the recent regulations may address one obstacle to effective utilization of the public choice provision, they do not address
one of the key obstacles: lack of viable transfer options due to the
intra-district restriction on the transfer provision. Conceptually, the
NCLB public choice provision is on the right track by allowing for
student mobility in order to increase educational opportunities for
students. By encouraging cooperative agreements between school
districts and prohibiting schools from using "lack of capacity" as a
basis to deny students the right to transfer, the public choice statutory provisions and regulations undoubtedly attempt to ensure that
some choice of a transferring school is available to students. In reality, however, effective use of the public transfer option is
constrained both by the lack of viable intra-district transfer options
and the lack of incentives for school districts to create viable options. As noted earlier, poorer-performing schools that are
required to implement the public choice remedy are typically clustered within the same school districts. 184 As a result, the geographic
limitation of transfers to "intra-district" transfers often means that
students eligible to transfer will have only a nominal choice of
schools to choose from because many of the schools within the

181.

RON ZIMMER ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE

BEHIND ACT: VOLUME

No

CHILD LEFT

1-TITLE I SCHOOL CHOICE, SUPPLEMENTAL EDUCATION SERVICES,

available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/
STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT 8 (2007),
ED497259.pdf.
182. See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 10, at 63 (noting the inconsistencies and inadequacies
in school procedures for notifying students and parents of their right to transfer); Frederick
M. Hess & Chester E. Finn Jr., Inflating the Life Rafts of NCLB: Making Public Choice and Supplemental Services Work for Students in Troubled Schools, 86 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 34, 34-39 (2004)
(noting that "[d]istricts unenthusiastic about the NCLB remedies can and do drag their feet
in myriad ways: sending parents indecipherable letters, making a 'needs improvement' label
on a school sound like a badge of honor, providing unclear direction (and plenty of red
tape) to parents regarding their options").
183. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION, STRENGTHENING CHOICE AND FREE TUTORING 1,
3 (2008), available at http://www.ed.gov/policy/elsec/reg/proposal/strengtheningchoice.pdf.
184. See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 10, at 63.
AND
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school district will also be in "improvement status" and ineligible to
receive transfers. 5
Furthermore, although the Act encourages school districts to establish cooperative agreements with neighboring school districts to
accept transfers, higher-performing school districts have no incentive to enter into such an agreement. This is because large
numbers of students from poorly performing schools are likely to
decrease the overall academic performance of a school. AYPcompliant schools and school districts therefore have no incentive
to enter into such agreements if they fear that incoming students
will negatively impact their academic performance scores and put
them in danger of not meeting their own AYP requirements.'"
Moreover, although charter schools are eligible to receive transfers
under the Act, most high-performing charter schools have long
waiting lists and are unlikely to be able to accommodate transfer
requests. All these factors mean that there is often not enough
space in AYP-compliant schools to provide viable transfer options
for more than a handful of students. Consequently, the public
choice remedy in its current form provides students a right without
a viable remedy to exercise that right.
C. Taking a Regionalist Approach to Public Choice: Suggested
Changes to the Public ChoiceProvision
1. Incorporating an "Affirmative Duty" into
the NCLB Statutory Framework
As discussed in Section III.D, the FHA mandates that HUD take
affirmative action to further fair housing. FHA's Section
3608(e) (5) statutory language and cases interpreting the scope of
that language provide an analytical framework that allows for citizen mobility by requiring HUD to act regionally, rather than
185. See, e.g., Erin Dillon, In Need of School Improvement: Revising NCLB's School Choice Provision, in IDEAS AT WORK 1, 1 (2008), availableat http://www.educationsector.org/usrdoc/
NCLBChoiceIdeaatWork.pdf (noting that in 2004, 175,000 students were eligible to
utilize the NCLB public choice provision but only 438 students or less than 1% utilized the
transfer option "due to a scarcity of nearby higher-performing schools and competition for
space in those schools from the many lower-performing schools in Chicago").
186. SeelHess & Finn, supra note 182, at 37.
187. Cf ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, CHOICE WITHOUT EQurrY:
CHARTER SCHOOL SEGREGATION AND THE NEED FOR CIVIL RIGHTS STANDARDS 37 (2010),
available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-anddiversity/choice-without-equity-2009-report (finding increased racial segregation in charter
schools and that higher performing charter schools have stringent requirements for admission and sizeable waiting lists).
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locally. Such a framework, if emulated, would increase the effectiveness of the NCLB public choice provision. In particular, language
could be added to NCLB similar to the Section 808(d) language requiring school districts-referred to as Local Educational Agencies
("LEA") in the Act-to "affirmatively further" the educational
achievement of all racial, ethnic, and socio-economically disadvantaged groups. In the FHA context, the inclusion of the "affirmatively
further" language has meant that HUD is required to take affirmative action to fulfill the FHA's stated goal of maintaining open,
integrated housing patterns."'
NCLB's stated goals. are, among other things, "meeting the
educational needs of low-achieving children in our Nation's highest-poverty schools"" and "closing the achievement gap between
high- and low-performing children, especially the achievement
gaps between minority and nonminority students, and between
disadvantaged children and their more advantaged peers."'90 If
language similar to Section 808(d) of the FH-A were added to the
NCLB, it could also be construed to require states and LEAs to do
more than simply offer a basic level of education. In particular, as
evidenced in the FHA cases interpreting the Section 808(d) lanadding similar "affirmatively furthering" language to
guage,
NCLB could mean that states and LEAs have a duty to act regionally where necessary in order to "close the achievement gaps
between minority and nonminority students" and to meet the
needs of low-achieving students in high-poverty schools.
To the extent that mobility programs similar to the Gautreaux
and BHM programs have been tried in the education context, such
programs have been successful. For example, successful interdistrict school desegregation plans are currently in place in a
number of cities such as St. Louis, Missouri' 2 and Hartford,
188. See Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1134 (2d Cir. 1973) (reasoning that 3608(d) (5) requires HUD to take action "to fulfill, as much as possible, the goal
of open, integrated residential housing patterns and to prevent the increase of segregation,
in ghettos, of racial groups whose lack of opportunities the Act was designed to combat").
189. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2) (2006).
190. Id. § 6301(2).
191. See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 503 F.2d 930, 936 (7th Cir. 1974) ("After
careful consideration and reflection we are obliged to conclude that on the record here it is
necessary and equitable that any remedial plan to be effective must be on a suburban or
metropolitan area basis."); Thompson v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 348 F. Supp. 2d
398, 458 (D. Md. 2005) (finding that "HUD must take an approach to its obligation to promote fair housing that adequately considers the entire Baltimore Region").
192. The St. Louis inter-district transfer plan, like the Gautreaux and BHM programs, is
an outgrowth of a lawsuit alleging de jure school segregation. Liddell v. Bd. of Educ., 469 F.
Supp. 1304, 1309-12 (E.D. Mo. 1979), rev'd and remanded, Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d
1277, 1281-84 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980). In 1980, the district court

SPRING

2011 ]

Leveling Localism and RacialInequality

663

Connecticut. A long-term study of these programs has concluded
that students who transfer out of poor, urban school districts into
more affluent suburban school districts typically score higher on
standardized tests than their peers who remain in urban schools. 9 3
The inter-district programs have also helped to improve racial
attitudes in the suburbs and have empowered minority parents to
mobilize in order to obtain better educational opportunities for
their children. 9 4 The success of these mobility programs in both
the housing and education context is a promising sign that they
should be replicated on a larger scale through the NCLB public
choice provision.
2. Recalibrating AYP Accountability Scheme on the Regional
Level Rather than the School District Level
The NCLB accountability system could be amended to hold
LEAs accountable for making AYP on a regional rather than an
individual basis. Currently, as discussed in Section IV.A.1.(i), the
Act's accountability scheme requires individual schools and school
districts to meet AYP requirements and imposes penalties on
individual schools and school districts that fail to make AYP.]9"
NCLB could be amended such that the states are responsible for
carving out regional zones that encompass LEAs or school districts
that are in close geographic proximity to one another. In addition
to each individual school and school district being required to
make AYP, each regional zone identified by the state should also
have to make AYP. If the regional zone as a whole fails to make
AYP, each school district that comprises the regional zone should
be penalized as discussed infra in Section IV.C.ii. More
importantly, the public choice provision should be amended to
require schools that fail to make AYP to offer students the
opportunity to transfer to any school within the regional zone that
is within a reasonable driving distance from the transferee home
school. Amending the NCLB accountability scheme generally and
the public choice provision specifically in this manner furthers the
ordered the implementation of a desegregation plan within the city schools. Liddell v. Bd. of
Educ., 491 F. Supp. 351 (E.D. Mo. 1980), afd, 667 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1091 (1981). In 1983, the parties entered into an agreement that created a voluntary
inter-district transfer program in which African-American students from the city of St. Louis
were permitted to attend certain suburban schools and white suburban students were permitted to attend city schools.
193. See WELLS ET AL., supra note 14, at 5.
194. See id. at 7-12.
195. See20 U.S.C. § 6316(a)-(b).
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goal of utilizing a regionalist approach rather than a localist
approach toward equalizing educational opportunities for poor
and minority students.
3. Fiscal and Accountability Incentives Should Be Incorporated
into the Public Choice Provision to Encourage
Inter-District Transfers
In addition to amending the general NCLB statutory scheme to
include an "affirmatively furthering" requirement and holding
LEAs responsible for making AYP on a regional basis, the public
choice provision should be amended to include fiscal incentives to
induce inter-district transfers. As other scholars and education activists have noted, one of the primary impediments to effective
inter-district plans is cost, particularly transportation costs and
costs incurred by the school district receiving the transferee student.'96 A separate funding stream should be created so that states
and not the individual school districts (i.e., neither the sending
nor receiving school district) should be required to bear the costs
of transportation or any other costs associated with the transfer.'97
Another concern associated with inter-district transfers is that
the AYP calculations for the receiving school district may decline,
discouraging school districts from taking on transfers.'99 To address
this concern, the Act should be amended such that schools that
receive large numbers of transfer students can have those students
counted out for AYP calculations for an appropriate length of time
(i.e., one year). Along these same lines, transfer students should be
afforded additional education services, such as tutoring to help
them improve their academic skills if necessary.
Finally, LEAs that fail to make AYP on the regional basis, discussed supra in IV.C.ii., should be penalized financially with a
penalty or deduction of ESEA funds levied on each individual LEA.
Such a financial penalty will hopefully inspire cross-collaboration
between LEAs on a regional basis.

See BROWN, supra note 10, at 59-70.
197. Id. at 63.
198. See, ag., Abigail Aikens, Note, Being Choosy: An Analysis of Public School Choice Under
No Child Left Behind, 108 W. VA. L. REv. 233, 248 (2005).
196.
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CONCLUSION

School district boundary lines play a vital role in dictating educational opportunities for students. The federal judiciary has
fervently embraced localism in its school equity jurisprudence,
making it unlikely that federal courts will act to mitigate the inequities caused by school district boundary lines. Moreover, the
likelihood of obtaining racial and economic residential integration
is minimal at best, particularly in light of exclusionary zoning and
other practices that contribute to residential segregation. Consequently, in order to help alleviate the educational inequities caused
by racially and socio-economically segregated schools, access to
high-quality schools and educational resources must be disentangled from access to middle-class and affluent residences.
In this Article, I have argued that the public choice provision
should be amended to better facilitate inter-school district transfers. Due to the cooperative federalist nature of the NCLB
statutory scheme itself and the practical inability of states to opt
out of receiving Title I funding, the NCLB public choice provision
is an ideal point from which to reform the NCLB and to challenge
the localist paradigm that dominates the provision of education in
America. This Article proposes revising the NCLB to require
school districts to "affirmatively further" the educational achievement of all groups, thereby encouraging school districts to
participate in more cross-district collaboration transfer plans. Such
an approach should help reverse the segregative effects of educational localism and equalize educational opportunity for poor and
minority students.

